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Abstract 
This article examines expert knowledge utilization in public policy processes. We study 
how much expert knowledge is employed and the extent to which decision-makers 
deliberate on the information provided by the experts, under various conditions of 
political disputes and public attention. We suggest four hypotheses. It is proposed that 
expert knowledge will be used more, but that there will be less deliberation in situations 
of political disputes. It is also suggested that expert knowledge will be consulted more 
and the decision-makers will take a more deliberative approach when there is a lot of 
attention from citizens. Our empirical findings, based on original data from local 
politics in Sweden, are in line with the hypotheses. The findings highlight the 
importance of both studying the extent of expert knowledge use and the way expertise is 
utilized. Another important insight is that politics seem to matter in relation to the role 
expert knowledge plays in public policymaking. 
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2  IFAU – Towards reason 1 Introduction 
Important political decisions are difficult to make. Politicians often have scant 
information about whether earlier solutions had the intended effects. Even when that 
kind of knowledge is available, it is usually very hard to know whether a suggested 
solution will work in a new situation. Despite this complexity, most of us acknowledge 
that decisions can be based on some form of reasoning: in most situations, one decision 
is not just as good as any other decision. Therefore, we want political policymaking to 
be as sensible as possible, given the circumstances. First, we want relevant and 
important information to be made available for politicians. Second, we want politicians 
to ponder critically how to use the information. Both these things are necessary. 
Without good information, there is a strong risk of bad decision-making. Without a 
deliberative approach, there is a risk of misuse or misinterpretation of the information. 
This will not only produce doubtful decisions, but also jeopardize the basis for 
democratic accountability; politicians who can claim that they had little information, 
which was not discussed much by anyone, may try to avoid blame and be difficult to 
hold accountable. Thus, making use of expert knowledge with a deliberative approach is 
important for a reason-based policy process. In this article, we study expert knowledge 
use both in terms of how much expertise is employed and the extent to which politicians 
deliberate on the information provided by the experts.  
Policymaking based on “evidence” or “what works” is often viewed as a pathway 
towards reason in the public sector. Making use of expertise is expected to eliminate 
“inefficient uses of resources or wrong decisions” (Landry et al.  2003, p.  192). 
Accordingly, there is interest worldwide in integrating scientific work and expert 
reports on policy processes (see, for example, Boswell 2009; Davies et al. 2000; Drori 
and Meyer 2008; Furubo et al. 2002; Power 2003; Mulgan 2005). However, experts 
may have politically biased agendas (Mahon and McBride 2009), they can very seldom 
say something with certainty (Flyvbjerg 2001), and knowledge might be used in a 
symbolic instead of an instrumental way (Boswell 2009). Moreover, we do not want the 
policy process to be controlled by policy analysts and academic scholars rather than by 
democratically elected representatives (Dahl 1989; Torgerson 1986). This means that in 
order to find out what role expert knowledge has in policymaking it is important to find 
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should make judgments based on expert information rather than ignoring what expert 
studies have to say. But since we do not want politicians to select only those parts of 
available information that suit predetermined positions, and we do not want them to 
totally surrender to the experts, we argue that it is valuable if decision-makers approach 
expert knowledge in a reflective, deliberative way. That is, they should be truly 
interested in the information, scrutinize and evaluate it extensively, and be prepared to 
change their opinions if – but only if – convincing arguments are presented.  
One important contribution of this article to the research literature is that we propose 
a way how to examine expert knowledge utilization and, especially, highlight the 
importance of simultaneously examine how much expert knowledge is used and the 
extent to which decision-makers deliberate. Another major contribution is that we study 
how political disputes and public attention to the policy process relate to these two 
dimensions of expert knowledge use. Political disputes and public attention have 
sometimes been discussed in relation to expert knowledge use (for example, Bourdeaux 
2008; Boswell 2009). But as far as we know there is no study that generates hypotheses 
and empirically examines how expert knowledge is employed and deliberated upon 
given various levels of political conflicts and citizen attention. 
We put forward four hypotheses: First, we suggest that expert knowledge will be 
used more when there are political disputes. Second, we expect politicians to deliberate 
upon the information to a lesser extent when there are disputes. Third, expert knowledge 
will be used more when there is a lot of public attention. Fourth, deliberation will be 
greater when there is public attention. Our empirical results support all four 
hypotheses.
1  
The following insight from the study is particularly important: If our analysis had 
focused upon the extent of knowledge use only, the conclusions would have been that 
both public attention and political disputes have similar roles. That is, expert knowledge 
is used more when politicians disagree and the public is alert. However, by including an 
analysis of how decision-makers respond we can show that this is a somewhat 
misleading interpretation. Public attention correlates with an evidence-informed but 
critical reflection – this is not the case when opinions among policymakers diverge. 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the findings, like the findings in the literature in general, should be interpreted in terms of 
correlations rather than causal effects due to methodological difficulties. 
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reason, this is not the case when there are political conflicts. 
The analysis is based on original quantitative data from Swedish local politics. The 
primary source of information is a questionnaire to managers in Swedish municipalities 
responsible for preparing decisions within four different types of committees/offices: 
(1) the municipal executive boards, and the offices responsible for (2) environmental 
policy, (3) labor market activities directed towards welfare recipients, and (4) primary 
education. The survey was conducted in 2010, and the response rate was 68 percent 
(747 individual responses).  
The article proceeds as follows: First, previous research is briefly summarized and 
we present our hypotheses (Section 2). Second, case and data are described (Section 3). 
Third, empirical results are reported (Section 4). A concluding section sums up the 
findings and discusses potential implications (Section 5). 
2  Knowledge and politics 
What do we mean by expert knowledge, the main concept in this article? Unfortunately, 
it is hard to provide a really distinct answer. Boswell (2009) concludes that “the 
boundaries dividing expert and non-expert knowledge are blurred, fluid and frequently 
contested … Ultimately the criteria for defining what counts as expert knowledge is 
contingent on the beliefs and interests of the administrators who are making use of it” 
(p. 25). We adhere to this position, but just like Boswell we think it is important to try to 
give the reader at least a somewhat more precise definition. Thus, we define expert 
knowledge as systematically gathered information presented in research, expert or 
evaluation reports. Systematically gathered information can be viewed as analysis that 
meets standards of coherence and honesty, and uses generally accepted research 
methods. Often, this corresponds to research findings produced by academic scholars. 
Sometimes, however, the concept is narrowed down to research results produced at 
universities (for example, Landry et al. 2003). But experts may not be academic 
scholars. Expert knowledge can be produced by, for example, research institutes, 
consultants, think tanks, or by units within the public administration itself or by other 
organizations. This means that we do not restrict the concept to work by academic 
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information is grounded on a scientific basis.  
Note that this definition implies that we are not interested in the expertise of officials 
and practitioners working with the issues at hand. Within primary education, for 
example, we do not count experiences by single teachers or head-masters, or even the 
general knowledge of officials at the department of education, as expert knowledge. 
This kind of expertise is of course important input to policy processes, but here we 
focus on a more academic type of expert knowledge. 
2.1  The extent of knowledge utilization – prior research 
How expert knowledge is integrated into policy processes has long been debated in the 
social sciences (for example, Boswell 2009; Caplan 1979; Lasswell 1971; Lindblom 
and Cohen 1979; Price 1965; Weiss 1979). The main task in the vast and disparate 
literature has been to develop and test theories on how to explain the extent of 
knowledge utilization within public organizations (for example, Belkhodja et al. 2007; 
Landry et al. 2003; Rich and Oh 2000).  
In the so-called “science push model” the supply of advances in research results is 
emphasized as the main mechanism of knowledge use. Basically, it is claimed that 
utilization increases with scientific progress (Landry et al. 2001). In line with this, King 
(2007) argues that it makes a significant difference if experts agree that they have a 
solution to the problem, or if they can give only tentative answers. Another perspective, 
sometimes labeled the “demand pull model”,  stresses  the needs of decision-makers. 
That is, knowledge will be used to a greater extent when experts focus on what 
decision-makers really need (Weiss  1979; Landry et al. 2001). In a third model, 
implementation barriers are considered a major obstacle to knowledge use in the public 
sector (Landry et al. 2001; Weitzman et al. 2006). Within this discussion the “two-
communities” hypothesis is often considered to be important (Caplan 1979). It suggests 
that politicians and experts belong to two different communities with different cultures 
and goals. This makes it hard for them to understand one another. 
The literature is rather messy. Theoretical perspectives, definitions of central 
concepts, findings, and the interpretation of results diverge. Thus, despite the fact that 
there is a substantial amount of empirical research, the field is usually considered to be 
underdeveloped (Belkhodja et al. 2007). It is difficult to say what variables affect 
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with check-lists of variables that are worth paying attention to if we want to understand 
the extent of knowledge utilization. 
One problem with the focus on the extent of expert knowledge use is that these 
studies in a way assume that using more expert knowledge is good per se. This is not 
certain and in a number of studies it has been argued that expert knowledge can be used 
for other reasons than in order to improve policymaking and enhance performance. 
Symbolic reasons is an example of an alternative motive (for example, Ahlbäck Öberg 
and Öberg 2012, forthcoming; Boswell 2009; Weible 2008; Weiss 1989). In order to 
rationalize the positions policymakers already have they “select and draw on research 
according to their interest in justifying particular claims” (Boswell 2008, p. 475). Thus, 
there is a political aspect that should be taken into account.  
Another problem with assuming that more knowledge use is always a desired goal is 
the risk that the policy process may become dominated by experts, where the politicians 
become little more than administrators. Suggestions put forward by the experts may be 
conceived as “truth” that is uncritically accepted, making the policy process resemble a 
technocracy (Ahlbäck Öberg and Öberg 2012, forthcoming; Torgerson 1986; 
Turner 2001).  
This means that studying expert knowledge utilization without considering how the 
information is approached by the elected representatives making political decisions is 
problematic. In the next section, a possible way of taking these things into account is 
presented. 
2.2  Two questions about expert knowledge use in policymaking 
The studies that have criticized the mainstream assertion that expert knowledge use is 
something inherently good have proceeded by developing theories on how to explain 
when expert knowledge is employed in certain ways, for example, instrumentally or 
symbolically (for example, Boswell 2009). Such an approach is legitimate and 
interesting. However, in this article another possible approach is suggested.  
If the goal is to understand what role expert knowledge has in policymaking, and 
ultimately how the policy process can be improved, we think it is important to ask at 
least two questions. The first is the question the literature has traditionally focused 
upon: To what extent is expert knowledge employed when policy decisions are prepared 
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“not at all”, or something in between. In Section 3.3.1 below, we discuss the concept in 
more detail.  
But as we have stressed above, it is also important to pay attention to politicians’ role 
in policymaking. Democratically elected or appointed officials are in a position to 
decide how to make use of information. This leads us to the second important question: 
Do politicians react in a reflective, deliberative way to information? Deliberation can 
be defined as a situation in which decision-makers are truly interested in and try to 
understand and scrutinize the information provided in expert studies. The politicians are 
prepared to change their opinions if good arguments are presented, but at the same time 
they do not accept expert suggestions without considering them thoroughly. This 
implies that there is no deliberation if expert knowledge is totally ignored or if it is used 
only in a symbolic way. On the other hand, it does not mean that politicians should 
always accept what experts have to say and automatically align decisions with expert 
suggestions. In essence, deliberation means that expert opinions are given a fair chance.  
Deliberation is a frequently used concept within political science (for example, 
Bohman 2000; Dryzek 2000; Öberg 2002). Usually the focus is upon relationships and 
discussions among politicians, or between policymakers and the public. In this article, 
we use deliberation as a possible approach taken by decision-makers towards the 
information presented in expert studies. 
2.3  Political disputes and public attention – four hypotheses 
Hitherto, we have underscored the importance of studying both the extent of expert 
knowledge utilization and the extent to which expert knowledge is approached in a 
deliberative way by decision-makers. That is, we have positioned our two dependent 
variables. The next step is to take a closer look at two important elements of political 
life that may affect what role expert knowledge is given in the policy process, namely 
the level of political disputes and public attention. 
Pluralism is a natural part of politics in modern democracies. Everyday politics is 
made up of controversies, conflicts and diverging opinions. Sometimes the 
disagreements are major, while other situations can be characterized by consensus. 
Public awareness, of course, is also something policymakers must pay attention to when 
making decisions. The public can sometimes be very alert, while at other times 
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given high and low levels of political disputes and public attention. As far as we know, 
there are no theoretical discussions or empirical studies on how the level of disputes and 
public attention affect how expert knowledge is treated in public policy processes.  
We have some basic standard assumptions to start with. First of all, the situation we 
are interested in is policy formulation in public organizations in which elected or 
appointed politicians are involved. Some kind of bureaucracy takes part in the process 
by collecting information and perhaps also comes up with policy advice. Typically, we 
might think of decision-making within ministries at various levels of government. 
Second, these units are assumed to maximize legitimacy and power, and they want to 
achieve some policy goals. Politicians want to accomplish something, but also get re-
elected. Thus, they both want to perform well and do things that look appropriate in the 
eyes of the public. Bureaucracies need internal as well as external legitimacy in order to 
achieve policy goals, maximize budgets and, in the long run, survive. 
Third, using expert knowledge has pros and cons. Evidence can, at least sometimes, 
provide answers and guide decision-making towards solutions that improve per-
formance. Furthermore, referring to research, or to “evidence” or “what works”, is often 
a powerful argument in the debate; phrases such as “our decisions are in line with the 
latest research”, could be used to motivate decisions but also to put the blame on 
someone else if policies turn out badly. On the other hand, it is costly and time-
consuming to acquire expert knowledge. Expert reports cannot always provide precise 
answers to the specific issues handled by political bodies. In addition, the answers 
experts offer are possible threats. They could challenge existing beliefs or be politically 
impossible to implement. Thus, expert knowledge usually cannot be regarded as a 
quick-fix, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that bureaucracies are not going to 
use it so much if there is no particular reason that drives them towards doing so. 
How would expert knowledge utilization look at low and high levels of political 
dispute, given these baseline assumptions? If we start in a situation in which politicians 
agree to policy solutions to a considerable extent, there is really no reason to collect 
expert knowledge – neither for the bureaucracies nor for the politicians. Decisions are 
not likely to change if more research evidence is gathered, and it is a costly process that 
perhaps could disturb the existing order. On the other hand, when politicians disagree 
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someone will put pressure on the administration to gather information. Moreover, it is 
less clear what the appropriate decision would look like and it becomes more important 
to provide arguments. A first hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H1. The extent of knowledge use will be greater in situations in which there are 
political disputes 
 
However, this hypothesis concerns only the first question put forward in Section 2.2. As 
previously underscored, it is also essential to consider how politicians approach expert 
knowledge. We argue that when there are conflicts, and involved actors’ opinions are 
far apart, it is less likely that politicians will respond with deliberation. Policy positions 
are threatened and it is more unlikely that compromises can be reached. Previous 
research suggests that cooperation decreases when actors’ opinions diverge 
(Lundin  2007). Moreover, Flyvbjerg (1998) and Boswell (2008) argue that political 
disputes have negative effects on how expert knowledge is treated. Flyvbjerg concludes 
that: 
… where power relations take the form of open, antagonistic confrontations, power-
to-power relations dominate over knowledge-power and rationality-power relations; 
that is knowledge and rationality carry little or no weight in these instances. As the 
proverb has it: “Truth is the first casualty of war.” (Flyvbjerg 1998, p. 232) 
Similarly, Boswell (2008) claims that in contested policy areas, knowledge can be used 
selectively to support a particular policy position rather than in an instrumental, rational 
way. Accordingly, a second hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2. Politicians will be less deliberative with regard to expert knowledge in situations in 
which there are political disputes 
 
A reasonable question now arises: If decision-makers do not listen that much to what 
experts have to say, as suggested by H2, why should information be sought, as 
suggested by H1? There are several possible answers. The most obvious is probably that 
it becomes even more important to use expert knowledge in a symbolic way; different 
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being used in policy formation. Another possibility is that the bureaucracy becomes 
more eager to justify an “expert position” when politicians disagree a lot. 
Turning to public attention, we can start by noting that in Western societies it is 
“appropriate” to be rational (March and Olsen 1989). Even though no politician (or 
bureaucrat) wants to be described as “strategic” to the point of being cynical (Öberg and 
Hallberg Adu 2009), rational behavior is a solid norm. Consequently, even powerful 
actors want to avoid being caught ignoring reasonable arguments. From this follows that 
it matters whether policy processes mainly are out in the open or proceed behind closed 
doors. Processes that are audited by the public may force the actors to behave in line 
with what Goodin (1995) calls “laundering preferences” in public debates, or Elster’s 
(1998) assertion that self-interested motives are almost impossible to use in public 
debates. Hence, the pressure on politicians and bureaucracies to use and treat expert 
knowledge in a deliberative way should be greater when they are scrutinized by the 
public. From this follows: 
 
H3. The extent of knowledge use will be greater in situations in which there is a lot of 
public attention to the policy process 
 
H4. Politicians will be more deliberative towards expert knowledge in situations in 
which there is a lot of public attention to the policy process 
 
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses 
 Knowledge  use  Deliberation 
Political dispute  H1: +  H2: - 
Public attention  H3: +  H4: + 
 
To sum up (see Table 1), we expect public attention to imply both more knowledge use 
and more deliberation. Political disputes, on the other hand, are expected to be 
associated with more expert knowledge utilization, but less reflection by the involved 
politicians.  
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The hypotheses are examined within the context of Swedish local government 
(municipalities). The selected case is good for several reasons. It gives us an oppor-
tunity to use large-n data and to analyze various units handling similar questions, but in 
different environments. This means that we can hold constant characteristics that are 
specific to certain municipalities and to certain policy areas. Moreover, since we are 
interested in the role of politicians in the policy process it is important to study 
organizations in which politicians are clearly visible. The Swedish municipalities are an 
obvious example of this. Public authorities are not such a good idea to analyze, since 
they operate at arm’s length from politicians. Central government ministries are 
suitable, but getting reliable large-n on knowledge use and deliberation within central 
government is probably not very easy. 
3.1  Swedish local politics 
In Sweden, there are 290 municipalities with an average population of about 30,000 
residents. The municipalities differ in size considerably: around 3,000 inhabitants live in 
the smallest entities and almost 800,000 in Stockholm, the largest city. Local 
governments have the constitutional right of self-government. They decide on their own 
organization and can freely set the local income tax, which is their main revenue. 
Municipalities employ about 20 percent of the workforce and provide a lot of services 
within, for example, the welfare sector. This includes daycare, social welfare services, 
primary education, and care of the elderly. In a comparative perspective, Swedish 
municipalities are often considered to have a high degree of autonomy (for example, 
Lidström 1996).  
Local policy is decided by politicians in various local committees, such as municipal 
executive boards and social welfare boards. Sometimes, committee members are full-
time, but most fulfill their mandate part-time (a couple of hours per week). The boards 
are served by a public administration that prepares decisions for committee meetings. 
We study the extent to which these administrations integrate expert knowledge when 
policies are designed, and the reactions of committee members towards the information. 
3.2  Data – a survey conducted within four policy areas 
Data consist of a survey of managers responsible for preparing decisions in the Swedish 
municipalities conducted in spring/summer 2010. Four different types of administrative 
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government and exists in all municipalities. Local top politicians are members of the 
executive boards and here lies the overall responsibility for managing and coordinating 
the whole local administration, including financial responsibility. The executive 
committees are the most powerful political institution at municipal level in Sweden 
(Bäck  2005). It is important to note that committee members are appointed in 
proportion to mandates in the municipal assembly: that is, they are coalition 
governments that include all parties in the assembly.
2 The office preparing decisions for 
the executive committees is the first category of local administrative units included in 
our sample.  
In addition, we study three specific policy areas. Primary education is one of the 
municipalities’ key responsibilities. The Swedish system for daycare and primary 
education was fairly centralized until the 1990s. A reform in 1990, when the authority 
to run primary (and secondary) schools was decentralized to the municipalities, changed 
this. The municipalities got full financial responsibility and the scope for differences 
between schools increased. Several other reforms in the years that followed augmented 
this development: wage-setting for teachers was decentralized, school choice was 
introduced, and steering by objectives became more important (Björklund et al. 2004). 
Schools must of course follow certain curriculums and rules established at national 
level. Nevertheless, the task of organizing primary education at local level is an 
important responsibility of local politicians. 
We also include units responsible for environmental policy in our sample. The 
municipalities have traditionally played an important role with regard to environmental 
policy, both as implementers of national legislation and by initiating local policies 
(Eckerberg and Mineur  2003). The municipalities are responsible for tasks such as 
health and environmental protection, sanitation and waste management, and water and 
sewage. Many of the tasks are somewhat technical and regulated by national law. 
The last policy area to be studied is labor market policy; or more precisely activation 
policies for social welfare recipients. Active labor market policy is a central, not a local 
government responsibility in Sweden. Thus, most political decisions are taken at 
national level and the Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) implements 
                                                 
2 This applies to the other committees studied in this article as well. 
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participate in labor market activities in various ways and are close partners with local 
PES offices. The main issue municipalities usually deal with is arranging labor market 
programs for unemployed social welfare recipients (Lundin 2007, 2008; Mörk 2011). In 
comparison to the three other types of unit studied in this article, labor market activities 
must be considered a minor issue. 
Scanning Internet homepages and making some telephone calls, we identified 1,093 
different units to include in our sample of administrative offices. It was possible to find 
administrations responsible for preparing decisions for the municipal executive boards 
and the committees of education in all 290 municipalities. We found environmental 
protection offices (or units with similar names) in 250 municipalities. Certain 
municipalities coordinate environmental issues with other municipalities. These were 
excluded. In addition, we could not locate an office, another unit or a specific individual 
handling environmental policy in some municipalities.
3 Labor market policy units of 
some kind were identified in 263 municipalities. There are some municipalities that are 
not involved in labor market issues at all, or have so few cases that no specific unit or 
individual has formal responsibility. This explains why we do not have 290 municipal 
labor market units.  
The survey was conducted among managers. Certainly, civil servants’ subjective 
judgments are not optimal assessments of what is really going on in the municipalities’ 
administrations. Nevertheless, it is hard to get really good objective indicators of the 
variables studied here, and we believe senior civil servants can provide the most 
credible description. Managers do have good insight into what is going on within their 
own, usually rather small, administrative unit. In addition, they observe the committee 
members’ actions close at hand. For instance, they normally participate in committee 
meetings. 
To collect data, we used a web survey as a first step, including three reminders. In 
order to increase the response rate, we distributed a somewhat shorter version as a 
postal questionnaire among non-responders in a second step. We use information from 
both procedures in this article. In the end, 747 answers were received which implies a 
                                                 
3 In many of these cases, the municipal executive board deals with environmental tasks. 
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4 The response rate was better in the case of 
municipal executive boards (about 78 percent), but worse within labor market policy 
(about 56  percent). Since labor market policy is a marginal municipal issue, often 
organized together with other tasks, the somewhat lower figure is not that surprising.  
An analysis of background characteristics showed that respondents are very similar 
to the population. Thus, we conclude that the non-responses are probably not too 
problematic in this case. 
3.3 Measures 
3.3.1  Knowledge use and political reflection 
Measuring the extent of expert knowledge use is, of course, difficult. There is a vast 
literature on the methodological problems associated with this, and several scales and 
indices have been suggested (Mandell and Sauter 1984; Landry et al. 2003). We will 
apply a process-oriented approach where knowledge utilization can be used at different 
“stages in which each is a link in the chain of utilization” (Knott and Wildavsky 1980, 
p. 545). This measurement has been employed in a number of studies (for example, 
Belkhodja et al. 2007; Landry et al. 2001, 2003; Lester 1993). In the original scale 
produced by Knott and Wildavsky (1980), there were seven stages of knowledge 
utilization. Landry et al. (2001; 2003) collapsed three stages that were closely linked 
into a single category, but added another one, ending up with a scale based on the 
following six stages: 
  
•  Reception – the extent to which expert knowledge is viewed as important within the 
administration 
•  Cognition – the extent to which expert and research reports are read and understood 
by civil servants 
•  Discussion – the extent to which there are discussions on findings presented in 
expert and research reports within the administration 
•  Reference – the extent to which references to expert and research reports are 
provided in relevant document produced by the administration 
                                                 
4 The various analyzes are conducted on somewhat fewer observations, due to internal missing values on some 
important variables. 
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expert knowledge into account 
•  Influence – the extent to which expert knowledge influences decisions 
 
We make use of the scale suggested by Landry and his colleagues, but make some small 
adjustments. We think it is less important to talk about “reception” and therefore we 
leave that stage outside our analysis. Moreover, in the “cognition” stage we think it is 
cleaner to let respondents assess the extent to which expert and research reports are 
read, leaving out the somewhat vague word “understand.” Thus, our scale of knowledge 
use is based on five stages. The managers were asked to assess (on a scale of 1–5) the 
extent to which each step applies to the work within their unit.  
To ensure that the items are one-dimensional and that they can be used to measure a 
non-manifest concept we conducted a factor analysis. By doing this, we obtain a more 
reliable measurement of knowledge utilization than is normally the case within the 
research literature. 
 
Table 2. The use of expert knowledge in local politics (principal component factor 
analysis) 
Item  Short description  Factor loadings 
Cognition  Read research or expert reports  0.875 
Discussion Discuss  research or expert reports  0.881 
Reference  Cite research or expert reports in documents presented to local politicians  0.899 
Effort  Make an effort to make local politicians take research or expert reports into 
account in decision-making 
0.897 
Influence  Research and expert reports are important for decisions-making in the 
municipality 
0.866 
Note: The question was formulated as follows: “How often does your unit use research and expert reports (from the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions, public authorities or universities) in the follow ways when issues are prepared before 
political decision-making?”All items were measured on a scale 1–5, where 1 = “never or in almost no issues” and 5 = “in all or 
almost all issues”. The retention of factors is based on the Kaiser criterion (i.e., eigenvalues greater than 1). The eigenvalue for the 
first dimension is 3.9 and this is the only dimension that fulfills the Kaiser criterion. The factor explains 78 percent of the variance 
in the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is .88 (values over .5 are often considered acceptable and 
values over .8 are often considered meritorious). 
 
Table 2 reports the results. All items load positively and very high on a single 
dimension. Thus, it looks like the items really can be used to calculate an index of the 
non-manifest variable knowledge use. The next step is to construct the index, which we 
compute by taking the mean value of the five survey questions. This implies that the 
variable’s range is 1–5; a higher score means that more expert knowledge is used by the 
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5 Figure 1 shows the distribution of the variable. The mean is 2.31, 




















1 2 3 4 5
Expert knowledge use (index 1-5)
 
Note: The index is based on the mean value of the survey questions reported in Table 2. The vertical line at 2.31 
indicates the mean. 
 
The measure presented above does not incorporate decision-makers’ actions and 
behavior when policy is formulated and decided. In order to capture this, we asked the 
managers to evaluate how the politicians in the committee they serve respond to the 
information presented by the civil service. In this case, we did not have any established 
method or scale to use. What we wanted to measure was the extent of deliberation. This 
includes (i) a willingness to understand the information, (ii) an attempt to scrutinize 
information, (iii) a preparedness to change opinions if good arguments are presented, 
but (iv) at the same time not accepting suggestions without critical reflection. We asked 
four questions on these matters in our survey. In order to see whether it was feasible to 
                                                 
5 As a robustness test we have also calculated factor scores from the factor analysis, and used them to construct an 
alternative index that puts different weight on the items (depending on the factor loadings). This approach is perhaps 
more correct, but the problem is that the results become difficult to interpret. Thus, the index based on the factor 
scores is not reported in the article. However, the results are not altered when this alternative index is employed. 
6 Note that the average is lower within the municipal executive boards (1.93) than within in the three other policy 
areas included in the study (statistically significant at the .05 level). The mean is 2.58 within primary education, 2.46 
within labor market policy and 2.37 within environmental policy. The differences between these areas are, however, 
not statistically significant at the .05 level. 
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another factor analysis (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Deliberative approach to the information presented by the administrative unit 
(principal component factor analysis) 
Item  Short description  Factor loadings 
Effort  Committee members make an effort to understand the information 
presented by the administrative unit 
0.849 
Scrutinize  Committee members ask questions and scrutinize the information 
put forward by the administrative unit 
0.810 
Preparedness to change  Committee members are prepared to change their opinions if good 
arguments are presented 
0.707 
Submissiveness Committee  members  do not accept suggestions from the 
administrative unit without critical reflection 
0.490 
Note: The question was formulated as follows: “To what extent do the following statements apply to the committee members your 
unit serves? All items were measured on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = “to a very low extent” and 5 = “to a very high extent”. The 
retention of factors is based on the Kaiser criterion (i.e., eigenvalues greater than 1). The eigenvalue for the first dimension is 2.1 
and this is the only dimension that fulfills the Kaiser criterion. The factor explains 53 percent of the variance in the variables. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is .69 (values over .5 are often considered acceptable and values over .8 are 
often considered meritorious).  
 
Once again, all items loaded as expected on a single dimension. We predicted positive 
factor loadings and this was also what we found. Accordingly, it is appropriate to use 
the four survey questions to compute an index of deliberation.
7 Exactly as in the case of 
knowledge use, we use the mean of the survey questions. That is, the index ranges 1–5 
and a higher score implies that the committee members take on a more reflective 
approach towards the information. Figure 2 describes the index (additional descriptive 









                                                 
7 Note that the factor loading of item four is lower than the other three (although still rather high). However, we have 
performed additional analyses to examine whether the results are robust to various definitions of deliberation. First, 
we have computed an index based on factor scores (i.e., item four gets a lower weight in the index). Second, we have 
excluded item four from the index. These analyses yield similar results. 
8 There are no statistically significant differences between the four policy areas. 
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Expert knowledge use (index 1-5)
 
Note: The index is based on the mean value of the survey questions reported in Table 3. The vertical line at 3.71 
indicates the mean. 
 
3.3.2  Political disputes and public attention 
Political disputes and public attention are also measured through managers’ subjective 
opinions. On a scale of 1–5, where 1 = “never or almost never” and 5 = “in all or almost 
all issues”, the managers stated how often (i) the politicians in the committee they serve 
have clear differences of opinions (political disputes), and (ii) the municipal inhabitants 
are very interested in the issues decided in the committee (public attention).
9 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A 1. 
3.3.3  Model specification and control variables 
In Section 4 we will use linear regression models where knowledge use and deliberation 
are our dependent variables, and where political disputes and public attention are our 
main independent variables.
10 The analysis starts out with simple models (called A1 and 
B1), with no control variables included. In order to minimize the risks of spurious 
correlations, additional control variables are successively introduced. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table A 1 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
9 Another survey question concerned perceived media attention to the issues handled in the administration. We have 
tried this question as an alternative definition of public attention and the results are not changed. 
10 We include political disputes and public attention as linear variables in the regressions. But we have also specified 
models that use dummy variables to capture conflicts and citizen attention instead. These more flexible specifications 
produce similar results and the conclusions are not altered. 
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characteristics. It is reasonable to assume that policymaking is different within the four 
policy areas. For instance, we know that central government regulations vary, as well as 
types of issues and the politicians’ and staffs’ backgrounds. This motivates policy area 
fixed-effects. In addition, the conditions might be different in different types of 
municipalities. Exactly what municipal variables matter is hard to tell, but factors such 
as size (Log(population)) and economy (tax base) can make it easier to make use of 
expert knowledge. Political leadership (government) can also be important. For 
instance, Barrling Hermansson (2004) has shown that members of the Swedish 
parliament approach expertise and knowledge in various ways, depending on what party 
they represent. Furthermore, the population trend (population change) is added as a 
control variable. The political climate becomes very different when the population 
decreases, since it means a severe threat to the municipal tax base. This can affect 
political conflicts and public attention, as well as the use of expert knowledge. Lastly, 
two citizen characteristics are incorporated in the model specification: how old the 
inhabitants are, on average (average age), and educational level (high education). A 
more highly educated or a younger population could perhaps trigger expert knowledge 
use. 
In models A3 and B3, five specific variables for each administrative unit/committee 
are added to the model specifications. We control for the managers’ estimation of 
available resources and the proportion of issues that involve cutting expenses (economy 
measure). The amount of resources and the extent of financial difficulties may have an 
impact on how expert knowledge is treated, but it could also affect relationships 
between politicians and the attention citizens pay to dealings within the specific 
committee. Moreover, the degree to which issues can be characterized by expert 
consensus, high complexity and regulation is also controlled for. More complexity and 
expert consensus are certainly expected to increase expert knowledge use. These factors 
could also affect the political climate. For instance, expert consensus might trigger 
consensus among politicians. The extent to which issues are regulated by law might 
affect the scope for expert knowledge use, as well as freedom of choice for local 
policymakers. 
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Lastly, we replace the municipal variables with municipal fixed-effects in models A4 
and B4. The motive for this is that it is obvious that some municipal specific 
characteristic might be important, and that the control variables introduced in previous 
models are not enough to rule this possibility out. These specifications are demanding, 
since it means adding almost 300 dummy variables to an analysis conducted on slightly 
more than 700 observations. However, as we will show below, the findings look fairly 
robust even with these specifications. 
4 Findings 
4.1 Main  results 
Table 4 reports the results from a number of OLS regressions where knowledge use and 
deliberation are used as dependent variables. Starting with the left part of the table, 
where  knowledge use is analyzed, we can see that political disputes has a positive 
coefficient in all model specifications. In the three first models it is around .10 and 
statistically significant at least at the .05 level. With the strictest model specification the 
coefficient drops a little to .08 and becomes statistically insignificant. The main reason, 
however, is a large increase in the standard error (by approximately 50 percent). Since 
model A4 includes municipal fixed-effects, this is not surprising. Thus, we think that 
the overall pattern indicates that expert views are, indeed, employed more when 
politicians disagree. It is always difficult to know whether an estimated correlation is 
small or large. In this case, knowledge use is increased, on average, by about .10 (on a 
scale 1–5) if public disputes increases by one step. In other words, going from the 
sample minimum to the sample maximum indicates an average difference of about a 
half scale step. In our views, this is a substantial although not extremely high difference.  
The effect of public attention is similar (around .10 to .17), but even larger and more 
stable when it comes to statistical significance. In units where the managers perceive the 
public to be very interested in the committee’s work, expertise is used to a greater 
extent. Table 4. OLS regressions with knowledge use and deliberation as dependent variables 
  Knowledge use  Deliberation 
  (A1)  (A2)  (A3)  (A4)  (B1)  (B2)  (B3)  (B4)  































































































































































































Municipal  fixed-effects  NO  NO  NO   YES   NO  NO  NO   YES   
Adj.  R²  0.06  0.16  0.19  0.25  0.04  0.07  0.12  0.17  
N  717  717  705  705  724  724  712  712  
Note: All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on municipality. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. The reference category to policy area is the municipal executive board. The reference category to type 
of government is right government.  
   Turning to the right part of the table, deliberation is used as the dependent variable. The 
coefficients of the main independent variables  have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in all specifications at least at the .05 level. The coefficient of 
public attention is positive (around .08 to .11) and the coefficient of political disputes is 
negative (around –.10 to –.13). This means that whereas politicians reflect more when 
the public is observant, they are more inclined to ignore expert information when their 
opinions diverge to a large extent. The coefficients in the last column should be 
interpreted as follows: When political disputes increases one unit, deliberation will be 
.10 lower on the scale 1–5. And when public attention increases one unit, deliberation is 
approximately .11 higher. Accordingly, the magnitudes of the effects are similar as in 
the case when knowledge use was analyzed. 
In sum, we find support for all four hypotheses: In committees where there are large 
political disagreements, more expert knowledge is collected. But at the same time the 
committee members approach the information in a less deliberative, reflective way. In 
committees where the managers observe a strong interest from municipal citizens, 
expert studies are consulted to a greater extent and the politicians take a more 
deliberative approach.  
4.2  Some methodological caveats and additional robustness checks 
There are some methodological problems with the analysis presented in Table 4 that call 
for comment. Our main variables are measured on the basis of managers’ subjective 
opinions. This could, of course, be a source of measurement error: questions and 
response alternatives might be interpreted in various ways. Unsystematic variations in 
interpretation are not particularly problematic, but there could be systematic bias as 
well. As a line of defense, it should be noted that using bureaucrats’ subjective opinions 
is the standard way to measure important variables within the relevant literature, and it 
is hard to come up with better research approaches that are viable.  
Another issue is that we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias. We 
have included a lot of control variables, but since our empirical setting is far from being 
some kind of experiment it is difficult to know whether all important factors are taken 
into account. The most obvious possibility is perhaps the risk that some units, for some 
unknown reason, “operate better” than others. This can certainly affect our two 
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and the level of political conflict.  
A third potential problem is that the assumed causal order could be questioned. The 
most apparent risk is that it could be the case that if politicians are very reflective the 
disputes among them decrease, rather than the other way around.  
The three caveats mentioned above lead us to the conclusion that it is appropriate to 
view the empirical results as correlations and tentative answers. However, we must 
stress that we are in no worse position than anyone else using questionnaires in order to 
find out the relationship between expert knowledge use and various independent 
variables.  
We have performed several robustness checks to see whether there are other possible 
problems with our findings in Section 4.1. First, alternative operationalizations of the 
main variables (see section 3.3) do not change the conclusions. Second, we have 
analyzed each policy area separately. Since the number of observations, of course, 
becomes much smaller than in the main analysis, the effects are often statistically 
insignificant. The sizes of the regression coefficients vary to some extent, but not 
enough to make us draw the conclusion that there are substantial differences among 
policy areas. However, it seems like the effect of public attention on the extent of 
knowledge use is larger within executive committees and smaller within labor market 
policy. In fact, in the latter case the effect is more or less zero. Moreover, we can see a 
slight tendency that political disputes has a more negative effect on deliberation within 
environmental issues and education policy than within the other two policy areas. Third, 
we have examined the potential interaction effects of political disputes and public 
attention. No significant interaction effect was detected. Fourth, various tests showed 
that we have no problems with influential outliers or multicollinearity. Fifth, we 
included control variables to account for how the data were collected (web survey or 
postal questionnaires). The main results were unaffected by this. 
5 Conclusion 
In this article we have studied the extent of expert knowledge use and how expertise is 
approached by politicians in policy processes under various conditions of political 
disputes and public attention. It is important to underscore that we have presented 
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attention and political conflicts are associated with pressure for a political organization 
to make more use of expert studies. While this seems to indicate a rational process, 
since information is gathered “when it is needed”, less rational results could have been 
expected. If the use of expert reports was obtained by standard operating procedures – 
that is, information only gathered by default, the same way in every situation – we 
would not find these correlations. Alternatively, if political organizations purposely 
closed themselves to the outside world when exposed to internal and external pressure, 
we would have found a negative relationship. The findings are, in this regard, 
encouraging to advocates of politics based on enlightened understanding. 
But we have argued for the importance of also studying how politicians approach the 
information gathered. More precisely, to what extent do politicians deliberate upon the 
information? The results are in line with our hypotheses that public attention is 
positively associated with a more deliberative approach, while politicians are less 
reflective in situations of political conflict. These findings suggest that public attention 
tends to imply instrumental rational utilization of knowledge in order to improve 
performance, whereas this is not the case when there are political disputes. Perhaps 
expert knowledge is often used in a symbolic way when there are large political 
disagreements.  
Accordingly, politics seems to matter with regard to the role research evidence and 
similar information play in policy processes. If we had focused only upon the extent of 
knowledge use, we would have missed this important insight. An important lesson for 
future research is therefore that politics should be taken into account, and that a key task 
is to try to illuminate under what conditions expert studies are used extensively but also 
in a deliberative way.  
In our opinion, an especially interesting aspect worthy of further study is therefore 
the role of political disputes. Our measure of political dispute does not distinguish 
between the intensity of the conflict and the distance between the conflicting parties. It 
might well be that these two dissimilar dimensions of political conflicts are differently 
associated with the use of research reports and other evidence-informed data. One 
hypothesis that we unfortunately are unable to test is that a polarized but less intensive 
conflict is easier to solve with more and better information than less polarized but more 
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we are studying. Although we might have satisfying control over this since we compare 
political organizations with the same assignments, there might be differences between 
conflicts over values (ideas, ideology), and conflicts over technical, administrative 
issues, or quarrels over particular issues unrelated to ideology. If political disputes in 
local politics basically are about value issues – redistribution and/or prioritizing of 
resources – it might be a sign of democratic health that politicians are more independent 
and trust their ideological compass more than expert reports in situations of severe 
political conflict. The results that indicate less reflection on expert knowledge when 
politicians disagree would in this case perhaps not be such a discouraging finding as it 
first appears to be.  
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Table A 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Short description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
A. Dependent variables 
    
Knowledge use  The extent to which expert 
knowledge is used in policy 
formulation (index) 
2.31 0.91 1.00 5.00 
Deliberation  The extent to which committee 
members approach 
information in a reflective way 
(index) 
3.76 0.63 1.50 5.00 
B. Main independent variables 
    
Political dispute  The extent to which committee 
members disagree to a large 
extent 
2.02  0.92 1 5 
Public attention  The extent to which citizens 
pay a lot of attention to the 
issues in the committees 
2.86  1.06 1 5 
C. Policy area fixed-effects 
    
Executive  committee  (reference)  30.25    
Education  26.91    
Labor  market  policy  19.81    
Environment  23.03    
D. Municipal characteristics 
    
Log(population)  Number of inhabitants 
(logarithm) 
9.87 0.94 7.82  13.63 
Population change  Change of population 
(percent) between 2008 and 
2009 
0.14 0.95  -2.20 4.55 
Tax base  Tax income per inhabitant 
(Swedish crowns) 
155,562  18,399 125,829 300,491 
Average age  Mean age of inhabitants  42.77  2.49  36.30  48.50 
High education  Proportion of inhabitants with 
a college degree 
0.13 0.06 0.07 0.43 
G o v e r n m e n t         
   Right (reference)    51.94       
   Left    32.26       
   Cross-bloc    15.80       
Continued 
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Table A 1. Continued 
E. Features of the specific administrative unit 
    
Regulation  The extent to which the issues 
handled in the unit are 
regulated in detail 
2.85  1.29 1 5 
Economy measure  The extent to which issues 
involve cuts in expenditure  
1.87  0.85 1 5 
High complexity  The extent expert knowledge 
is needed to understand the 
issues  
2.06  1.06 1 5 
Expert consensus  The extent to which experts 
agree on the solutions to the 
issues handled in the unit 
2.78  1.13 1 5 
Resources  The extent to which managers 
think the administrative unit 
has adequate resources 
(index) 
0.00 1.00  -2.61 1.81 
Note: All variables under headings A, B and E are based on assessments of the managers of each administrative unit. 
The variable Resources is based on managers’ assessments of available economic, staff, time, and competence 
resources on a scale of 1–5 (5 = no resource shortage at all). Data on the type of government (right, left or cross-bloc) 
are available through the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions: Right = government where one or 
several of the following parties take part (but none of the parties included in the category Left): Conservative Party, 
Centrist Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democratic Party. Left = government where the Social Democratic Party 
and/or the Left Party are included, but none of the parties in the category “Right” above. Cross-bloc = At least one 
party from each bloc is represented in the government. Other municipal characteristics under heading D are based on 
official data from Statistics Sweden (SCB). Publication series published by the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
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